COTTON v. GREGORY.
2. Assuming men, that the same rule,
whatever it be, should apply to grantor
as to grantee, the question is, what kind
of a way by necessity would a grantee
of an entirely surrounded lot take ;
would it be limited to the uses for which
the land was used at the time of the
grant, or would it extend to any use to
which the land was legitimately adapted ?
The analogies of the law seem to point
in the latter direction. It is clear that
if a way be created by an express grant,
not positively limited in its terms, the
grantee takes a general right, not limited to any prior or contemporaneous
use; but he may use the way for any
purpose for which he may use the land
to which the way leads. Indeed, this is
now the modern doctrine in England.
See Rihch v. Great Western Railway Co.,
28 Weekly Rep. 229; 19 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 470, and cases cited in note.
If this be so in express grants, why
not in implied grants ? Why should a'
grantee of land, entirely surrounded by
otlher land of his grantor, be restricted
to a way only for that purpose for which
the grantor had formerly used the premises, or that for which he began to use
it himself, immediately after the grant?
As a general rule, a grantee of land is
entitled by implied grant to any easement in the adjoining land of the grantor, which is necessary to render the
land .granted capable of enjoyment to

the full extent: Goddard on Easements
(Am. ed.) p. 109. It is a presumed
intention of the parties that the grantee
should have Me means of using the
thing granted, and therefore that he
should have all rights and powers in or
over the grantor's soil which may be
requisite for that purpose.
If a grantor wishes to restrict his
grantee to a right of way for some particular purpose only, it is easy for him
to insert such restriction in his conveyance, when of course the restriction
would be valid, (even if otherwise the
grantee might have taken a larger way
by implication), on the familiar ground
that expressurnfacitcessare taciturn. And
in the absence of any such restriction, it
seems reasonable to hold that the implied right extends to any use to which
the land is adapted, in its then condition.
whether formerly so used or not; but,
perhaps, not to a right to use the land
in a substantially altered or changed condition, as if it be converted from woodland, or agricultural land, into sites for
dwellings or manufacturing purposes.
This seems to bring the implied grant
by necessity into harmony with the implied grant arising from prescriptive
use. See Parks v. Bishop, 120 Mass.
341, as to the extent, and Atwater v.
.Bedfish, 11 Gray 150, as to the restriction of a prescriptive way.
EDxUND H. BENNETT.
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Where a deed, deposited as an escrow, was to be delivered by the depositaries,
when they should receive a good and sufficient warranty deed of certain property
for the grantor, and the referee found that "plaintiff was never given or tendered
any conveyance, sufficient or otherwise" of the property: Held, that this finding of
the referee was immaterial, inasmuch as the receipt of such conveyance by the dcpoitaries was all that was required by the condition of the deposit.
The rule that a fraudulent delivery by or procurement from the depositary, of a
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deed, irposited in escrow, will not operate to pass the title, even in favor of a subsequent purchaser in good faith, without notice, vill not be carried to the extent of
enabling the grantor to recognise the grantee's possession of the instrument as valid
for some purboses, and to disclaim it as nugatory for all others, especially when to
do so would result in an injury to an innocent party.
APPEAL

from Lancaster county.

John S. Gregory, in personam
.Lamb, Billing8ley & Lambertson, for appellee.
The facts are sufficiently stated by the court.
J.-None of the evidence on which the referee based his
findings of fact is before us, but, as no question is made as to its
sufficiency to support them, they must be taken as conclusive
between the parties. The only subject of present inquiry, there.
fore, is whether in view of the facts so found, the referee's conclu
sions of law, and the decree of the District Court thereon, can be
sustained.
There can be no doubt, from the facts found by the referee, that
the confidence reposed by the plaintiff in McMurtry & Gregory
was much abused by them, in dealing with the property intrusted to
their management, in a manner neither contemplated nor warranted
by the arrangement between them. But this fact must not lead to
the violation of well established rules of law, in redressing the
wrong done.
The third fact reported by the referee is that the consideration
of the escrow was that said deed was to be delivered to the said E.
Mary Gregory, grantee, only when good and sufficient warrantydeed of a one-sixteenth interest of and to the Buchanan Silver
Mine, of Georgetown, Colorado, should be received by said
McMurtry & Gregory, for Cotton, the plaintiff.
From whence this mineral interest was to come does not appear.
There is nothing to show that it was to be furnished or conveyed by
E. Mary Gregory. The inference from what does appear, is rather
that the firm of McMurtry & Gregory were to procure it from some
other source, by their own means, and that the conveyance of the
lots in question by Cotton to Mrs. Gregory was to be the consideration therefor, and enure to their benefit. It would seem, therefore,
that Cotton intrusted his escrow if not to his nominal grantee, at
least to the real parties interested therein. And it will be noticed
that its final delivery was not dependent upon the receipt of the
LAKE,
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deed for the interest in the silver mine by Cotton, but by McMur
try & Gregory, his agents, and the parties who had undertaken to
obtain it. As before shown the plaintiff's escrow was to be
delivered to the grantee named therein when McMurtry & Gregory
should receive for Cotton a proper conveyance of the mining
interest provided for. By the finding of the referee no tender
of such conveyance to Cotton was necessary before the escrow was
passed over to Mrs. Gregory, so that the fifth finding, that "plaintiff was never given or tendered any conveyance, sufficient or
otherwise, of any interest in the Buchanan Silver Mine, at any
time before the commencement of this action," is wholly immaterial,
as McMurtry & Gregory do not appear to have been under any
obligation to make such tender. If they had received such conveyance for Cotton, and held it subject to his order, that would have
fulfilled the condition of the deposit of the escrow. There ought,
therefore, to have been a finding upon this point, in order to show
the defendants in default.
The referee also finds that after the delivery of the deed to E.
Mary Gregory, one of the lots therein described was sold to one
Jacob Zeh, to whom title thereto was conveyed through the deed in
controversy; and in reference to this sale and conveyance to Zeh,
the referee finds that Cotton first learned of it in October or
November 1876; and, in December 1876, McMurtry, one of the
firm of McMurtry & Gregory, to whom the deed was intrusted in
escrow, paid and turned over to plaintiff the proceeds, "which
plaintiff received and retains.
From the fact of the receipt of the proceeds of the sale of this
lot to Zeh, the referee concludes, very properly, that the plaintiff
had notice, in December 1876, of the delivery of the deed to Mrs.
Gregory. That he had such notice is abundantly shown, also, by
this other fact, found by the referee, viz.: that in "May or June
1875, and before plaintiff heard of the sale to Zeh, E. Mary Gregory sent by mail to Georgetown, Colorado, where he then was, a
deed of reconveyance of the premises, * * * with warranty of title,
which deed plaintiff retained in his possession about two years,"
when he returned it to her. This return, however, was not until
he discovered that certain encumbrances had been put upon the lots
while the title was in Mrs. Gregory.
After this notice that the deed was delivered, and having thus
recognised it as valid for the transmission of title to Zeh and to
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himself, surely Cotton is not in a position to claim successfully,
that it is void for want of delivery as to other bona fide purchasers,
without notice of his latent equity in the property. With this
view of the case, an inquiry becomes necessary as to the bona fides
of the claims of other of the defendants, third parties, who by the
pleadings are shown to have interests that should be disposed of,
and which seem to have been entirely overlooked or disregarded by
both referee and court. To determine these interests properly, a
reformation of the pleadings may be necessary. And, holding as
we do, that under the facts found by the referee, there was a valid
delivery of the deed as to innocent third parties, and it being conceded that Mrs. Gregory has already voluntarily made and delivered to the plaintiff a deed of reconveyance of all her interest
in the lots, which for aught that appears, is still available to him, it
is exceedingly doubtful whether, without such reformation any
relief whatever could be afforded in this form of action. It may
be that he should resort to the covenants of the deed of reconveyance, or to an action for damages against his agents, McMurtry
& Gregory.
While we recognise fully the rule, that a fraudulent delivery by
or procurement from the depositary of a deed, deposited as an
escrow, will not operate to pass the title, even in favor of a subsequent purchaser in good faith, without notice, still we cannot permit it go to the extent of enabling the grantor to affirm or recognise the grantee's possession of the instrument as valid for some purposes, and to disclaim it as being nugatory for all others, especially
when to do so, would result in injury to an innocent party.
For these reasons the judgment must be reversed, and the cause
remanded to the court below, for further proceedings in conformity
herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
It is familiar doctrine of elementary
law, that a deed takes effect only from
the time of its delivery ; that at law an
escrow takes effect as a deed (the condition having been performed), only from
the date of its second delivery, that is,
from the date of its delivery by the depositary to the grantee or to some one
representing him: Dyson v. Bradshaw,
23 Cal. 528; Green v. Putnam, I Barb.

estate remains in the grantor or his
heirs: Green v. -utnam, 1 Barb. 500;
Jackson v. Rowland, 6 Wend. 969.
Thus, where land is sold, part of the
purchase price paid, and a deed execeted and placed in the hands of a third
person to be delivered to the grantee,
and the balance of the purchase price to
be paid on the happening of a certain
event, if the grantor dies before the

50C. Until such delivery is made, the
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not vest in the purchaser, but descends
to the heirs of the vendor, subject to the
equitable rights of the purchaser; and
if the heirs afterwards make a deed to
the purchaser, such deed conveys an
absolute title to the land, and is not a
deed of confirmation, because there has
been no previous deed delivered nor estate to be confirmed: Teneick v. flagg,
29 N. J. L. 25. And where a deed
of land was delivered as an escrow, and
an absolute delivery subsequently made,
but previous to the second delivery a
judgment was obtained against the
grantor, under which the land was sold,
it was held, that the purchaser under the
judgment was entitled to the land:
Jackson v. Rowland, 6 Wend. 666.
In equity, however, the title to the
property conveyed, vests in the grantee
immediately upon the performance of
the condition upon which the escrow is
to be delivered to the grantee by the
depositary. It is the performance of the
condition and not the second delivery,
that gives an escrow vitality and existence as a deed: State Bank v. Evans, 15
N. J. L. 155. In Stanton v. Millar, 65
Barb. 58 (s. a. 58 N. Y. 192), it is
said that where the contingency upon
which an escrow was to be delivered,
viz., the death of the grantor, had happened, and the grantees had fully performed the contract on their part, the
arrangement created an absolute, equitable (if not legal) title on the death of
the grantor; and that the grantees were
entitled to a delivery, and the custody
of the deed, and to have the same recorded.
Deeds may be delivered to arbitrators
for their disposal, as they shall award
the title; and upon the award being
published, the deed to the person in
whose favor the award is made becomes absolute: Peck v. Goodwin, Kirby
(Conn.) 64.
But, while the general rule is, that an
escrow becomes effectual as a deed, in
equity, from the date of performance of
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the condition, and at law from the date
of the second delivery, yet, where the
parties make known their intention that
the escrow shall, after condition performed, take effect from the date of the
deed, instead of from the date of performance or of delivery, such intention
will control. Thus, where deeds were
executed May 1st 1860, and it was
agreed that if certain bonds and mortgages were delivered by the fall of that
year, such deeds, which were placed in
the hands of the attorney of the grantee,
should take effect May 1st 1860, it was
held, that by such agreement the deeds
took effect from that day, if the bonds
and mortgages were delivered within
the time specified; Price v. -ittaburgh,
4-c., Railway Co., 34 Ill. 13.
In the absence of any expression by
the parties of an intention as to when it
shall become effectual, an escrow may
take effect as a deed, from the date of
its deposit or first delivery, in cases
where it is necessary that it shall so take
effect, in order to protect the grantee
against intervening rights. Thus, where,
after the deposit of an escrow, the grantor dies or becomes insane, or, if a feme
sole, marries before performance of the
condition, the law will make the second
delivery relate back to the time of the
deposit of the escrow: 1 Shop. Touch.
123. And see Lessee of Shirley v.
Ayres, 14 Ohio 307 ; Beekman v. Frost,
18 Johns. 543; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Mass.
307; Hall v. Harris, 5 Ired. Eq. 303;
Harkreader v. Clayton, 56 Miss. 383.
So, where a deed was deposited by the
grantor with W., as an escrow, to be
delivered to the grantee, on his producing a mortgage executed and recorded
and a certificate of the clerk, of there
being no other incumbrance of record;
and W., on receiving the mortgage and
the certificate of registry by the clerk,
delivered the deed to the grantee and
the mortgage to the grantor: Held, that
the condition was performed and the
deed well delivered to the grantee, and
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that it related back so as to give effect
to an intermediate convevance by tie
grantee to C., although the clerk made
a mistake in the registry of the mortgage: Beekman v. Frost, supra.
It is not, however, an universal or
even a general rule, that the doctrine
of relation attaches to instruments of this
character. It is only allowed in cases
of necessity, to avoid injury to the operation of the deed, from events happening between the first and second delivery : Loubat v. Kipp, 9 Fla. 61.
Performance of the condition and delivery of the deed are necessary fully to
pass the title to the grantee. PerformRace of the condition is always essential,
though, as already shown, at least an
equitable title would pass without delivery. If, without performance of condition, the depositary, without ainthority or in fraud of the grantor, delivers
the escrow to the grantee, it will be inoperative as a deed in the latter's hands,
th .agh he be ignorant that the depositary acted without authority or fraudulently. Under these circumstances, it
will be inoperative even if the grantee
take it in good faith, not knowing that
there is any condition imposedi upon its
delivery, and although he advances a
valuable consideration upon it; Smith
v. South Royalton Bank, 32 Vt. 341 ;
Abbott v. Alsdorf, 19 Mich. 157; State
Bankv. Evans, 15 N. J. L. 155; Peter
v. Wright, 6 Ind. 183; HarkreaderY.
Clayton, 56 liss. 383.
An escrow may be recorded, and since
recording is not per se evidence of delivery, the recording of such deed, with
the knowledge and consent of the grantor and grantee will not render it binding upon the former, in case of a fraudu-

lent delivery of it by the depositary to
the grantee, and assignment by him to a
bonafide assignee for value, if the grantor consented to such recording, with the
express understanding that "lie depositary should still retain the deed after it
was recorded, until the performance of
the condition upon which it was to be
delivered: Smith v. South rw alton
Bank, 32 Vt. 341.
A fortiori no title passes to a grantee,
who by his own fraud obtains possession
of a deed deposited as an escrow. In
Roberts v. Mullenix, 10 Kans. 22, where
possession of a bond deposited in escrow
was fraudulently obtained by the obligee,
and by him assigned, it was held that no
right passed to the assignee as against
the obliger. The reason of this rule is
obvious : to give effect as a deed to an
escrow fraudulently obtained by the
grantee is to allow him to take advantage of his own wrong. Obtaining the
deed by fraud, larceny, or any means
short of performance of the condition, is
against the assent of the grantor, and as
assent is necessary to delivery, and a
delivery to the validity of the deed, the
grantee gets no title, and cannot transmit
any, even to a bona fide purchaser, from
him without notice and for value: Harkreader V. Claton, 56 Mliss. 383; Everts
V. Agnes, 6 Wis. 462 ; S. c. 4 Id. 343;
Boyle v. Boyle, 6 Mlo. App. 594, note.
The fraudulent delivery by or procurement from the depositary, of a deed
deposited in escrow, being voidable, it
is very properly ruled in the principal
case that, if avoided at all, it must be
avoided in toto: and that, if the grantor
once affirms the deed, he cannot thereafter avoid it.
X. D. EwEm..
CMOAoo.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
WILLIAM L. PRINCE v. WILLIAM B. SKILLIN.
The legislature has full control over the forms of process and the rules of procedure.
All offices, except when legislative authority is limited or restricted by constitutional provisions, are subject to legislative control.
Where there are two, conflicting legislatures, each claiming of right to e~xercise
legislative functions, it is for the courts, whenever the question comes before them,
to determine by which body legIslative authority has been lawfully exercised.
The action of the governor and council as a canvassing board is not final and conclusive. As to the members of the legislature such action is subject to the revision
of the Senate and House of Representatives respectively. As to county officers it
is subject on proper process to judicial investigation before judicial tribunals.
An election is not to be set aside because illegal votes have been cast which do not
affect the result.
. The votes of a city or town are not to be rejected because the word " scattering"
was written upon a ballot, or because the clerk may have returned a ballot as so cast
when it was not.
THE plaintiff, claiming to have been duly elected county commissioner for the county of Cumberland, brings this bill against
the defendant, whom he alleges to have been wrongfully declared
elected to that office, when, in fact, he was not so elected.
This proceeding is under and by virtue of c. 198 of the Acts
of 1880, entitled "an act providing for the trials of causes involving
the rights of parties to hold public offices."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
APPLETON, C. J.-The processes by which rights are to be
established and wrongs redressed are within and subject to legislative control. Old forms and modes of procedure may be abolished
and new ones established.
All offices, except when legislative authority is limited or restricted by constitutional provisions, are subject to the will of the
legislature. There is, with the above exception, no vested right in
an office or its salary. The office may be abolished. The mode
of appointment may be changed. The length of time of official
existence may be shortened. The compensation for official services
may be diminished: Farwell v. .Rockland, 62 Maine 298; Butler
v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. (U. S.) 403; Barker v. Pittsburgh,4
Barr 51; Conner v. New York, 1 Selden 291; Taft v. Adams, 3
Gray 126.
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The Act c. 198 of the Acts of 1880, was passed to enable parties
duly elected to office, but not declared to be so elected, to contest
their rights before a judicial tribunal. The defendant was declared
electel to the office in controversy by the canvassing-board of the
state. The allegations in the bill are, that errors occurred in the
doings and proceedings of the board, and that upon a fair and
honest count the plaintiff was duly elected, but that the defendant
has usurped the office to which he was so elected. "When one is
charged with usurping an office in the Commonwealth, there must
be," remarks the court in Commonwealth v. Fowler, 10 Mass. 290,
"authority in this court to inquire into the truth of the charge."
This act gives a remedy in case of an erroneous or fraudulent count
by the canvassing-board. It will hardly be contended that if by
errors of computation, throwing out legal returns or counting
illegal ones, a candidate not duly elected is wrongfully declared to
be elected, there should not be some remedy provided for the party
actually elected, by which the wrong done may be corrected. If
the error is not subject to correction, then the canvassing-board, in
the exercise of irresponsible power, have full and absolute control
of the government, and may effectually stifle the voice of the
people according to their sovereign will and pleasure.
Before the passage of the act under consideration, the only
existing process by which right of one unlawfully holding an office
could be inquired into, was by quo warranto. This writ issues in
behalf of the state against one who claims or usurps an office to
which he is not entitled, to inquire by what authority he supports
his claim or sustains his right. The proceeding is instituted by the
attorney-general on his own motion or at the relation of any person,
but on his official responsibility. It lies against an officer appointed
by the governor and council or elected by the people. It removes
the illegal incumbent of an office, but it does not put the legal
officer in his place. It is insufficient to redress the wrongs of one
whose rights have been violated.
To restore a person to an office from which he has been unjustly
removed or unlawfully excluded, the proper process is by mandamus.
By this, the rights of one lawfully entitled to an office, but which
have been illegally withheld, may be enforced: Strong's Petitioner,
20 Pick. 497.
By quo warranto the intruder is ejected. By mandamus the
legal officer is put in his place. The Act c. 198, accomplishes by
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tone and the same process the objects contemplated by both these
processes. It ousts the unlawful incumbent. It gives the rightful
claimant the office to which he is entitled. It affords a speedy and
effectual remedy instead of the tedious and dilatory proceeding
of the common law.
It is insisted that this bill for various reasons cannot be sustained. The grounds of objection to its maintenance we propose
to examine.
1. The respondent contended that the legislature which passed
the act authorizing this and the governor approving it, could not
rightfully do so, because there was a prior defacto legislature with
a de facto governor, as set forth in the respondent's answer, not
ousted by any competent tribunal.
The act in question was passed by an organized and acting
legislature, approved by'the governor, and comes before us with all
the indicia of validity by which any act of any past legislature is
or can be evidenced.
When there are two conflicting legislatures, each claiming of
right to exercise legislative functions, it is for the court to determine
by which body legislative authority can be lawfully exercised. In
answer to inquiries made by certain gentlemen claiming official
position, under date of January 23d 1880, this court used the
following language: "When different bodies of men, each claiming
to be and to exercise the functions of the legislative department
of the state, appear, each asserting their titles to be regarded as
the law-givers for the people, it is the obvious duty of the judicial
department, who must inevitably, at no distant day, be called to
pass upon the validity of the laws that may be enacted by the
respective claimants to legislative authority, to inquire and ascertain
for themselves, with or without questions presented by the claimants,
which of those bodies lawfully represents the people from whon
they derive their power. There can be but one lawful legislature.
The court must know, for itself, whose enactments it will recognise
as laws of binding force, whose levies of taxes it will enforce when
brought judicially before it, whose choice of a prosecuting officer
before the court it will respect. In a thousand ways, it becomes
essential that the court should forthwith ascertain and take judicial
cognisance of the question, which is the true legislature ?"
We are bound to take judicial notice of the doings of the
executive and legislative departments of the government, when
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called upon by proper authorities, to pass upon their validity. We
are bound to take judicial notice of historical facts, matters of
public notoriety and interest passing in our midst. These views
are in full accord with the decisions of our highest tribunals. In
Swinnerton v. Columbian Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 188, it waF objected
that there was no evidence of a civil war. "This objection,"
observes HUNT, J., "1 do not consider a sound one. The rule I
take to be this: That matters of public history, affecting the whole
people, are judicially taken notice of by the courts; that no evidence
need be produced to establish them; that the court in ascertaining
them, resort to such documents of reference as may be at hand and
as may be worthy of confidence. Thus in the prize cases already
cited (2 Black 667) the court use this language: ' The actual
existence of civil war is a fact in our domestic history which the
court is bound to notice and to know.'
There the general facts
connected with the history of the case seem to have been assumed
u within the judicial cognisance of the court. Greenleaf in hie
work on Evidence, vol. 1, § 6, says, ' courts will also judicially
recognise the political constitution or frame of their own government; its essential political agents or public officers, sharing in its
regular administration; and its essential and regular political
3perations, powers and actions. Thus notice is taken by all
tribunals of the accession of the chief executive of the nation or
state, under whose authority they act ; his powers and privileges,
&c., * * * the sittings of the legislatures and its established and
usual course of proceedings. * * * In fine, courts will take notice
)f whatever ought to be generally known within the limits of their
jurisdiction. In all these and the like cases, when the memory
of the judge is at fault, he resorts to such documents of reference
as may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence.' It
is the duty of the court to know county officers: Farley v. Me Connell, 7 Lans. 428 ; much more the governor and legislature: &ate
v. Minnick, 15 Iowa 123."
After a careful consideration of the grave and important questions
proposed by the governor, the rightful legislature and a body of
gentlemen claiming, but without right, to be a legistature, this
court in its several answers of January last, announced the result
to which it had arrived: that the legislature by which the act under
iiscussion was passed, was the legislature to whose acts the obedience
of the people is due. In the correctness of the conclusions which
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were then reached, and in the principles and reasons upon 'which
those conclusions are based, we rest in perfect confidence.
To the same general effect are the cases of Wood v. Wilder, 43
N. Y. 164; Cuyler v. _errill, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 169 ; Rice v. Shook,
27 Ark. 137; Killebrew v. Murphy, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 546 ; Division
of Howard County, 15-Kansas 194; Turner v. Patton, 49 Ala.
406; Ashley v. Martin, 50 Id. 537; Smith v. Speed, Id. 276;
Andrews v. Knox County, 70 Ill. 65; Douthitt v. Stinson, 63 Mo.
268; .oscue v. Lyon, 55 Ala. 440.
The body of men which the counsel for the defendant terms by
courtesy a de'facto legislature, though its house was composed of
men who were and who were not elected-both classes not constituting a quorum-and of a senate, a part of whom, less than a
quorum, were duly elected, and a part were not elected, could not
legally act as legislative bodies. While this condition of affairs
remained there was no legal legislature. The greater portion of the
members of the bodies thus constituted took their seats respectively
in the rightful house and senate-a house and senate composed of
members unquestionably elected. They participated in its legislative action until its final adjournment. They received and acknowledged the receipt of the compensation to which by law they
were entitled as members of the legislature. There was no other
body claiming to exercise legislative functions. What the counsel
calls the de facto legislature became merged into the rightful
legislature, by which a governor was chosen in the accustomed
manner, who entered upon and is now discharging, without interference or obstruction, the duties of that office. All this is well
known as matter of current history, as well as by the legislative
journals.
The offered proof was properly excluded. It is immaterial
whether or not at some past time there was a de facto legislature
or a de facto governor-inasmuch as neither was such de jure-and
as the rightful legislature was not interfered with in the exercise
,of its legitimate powers, and the rightful governor is not disturbed
in the discharge of his official duties. The acting legislature and
the acting governor are both de facto and de jure the legislature
and governor of the state, and to be recognised as such.
2. It is .claimed that the decision of the governor and council
acted as a final canvassing-board, and that their final action constitutes an estoppel upon all other branches of the government,
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except the houses of the legislature in regard to the membership
of those bodies.
This is not so. The object of all investigations is to arrive at
true results. The canvassing-board, so far as relates to county cormmissioners, are limited and restricted to what appears by the
returns, except that by Revised Statutes c. 78, § 5, and c. 212 of
the Acts of 1876, "they may receive testimony on oath to prove
that the return from any town does not agree with the record of the
votes of such town, or the number of votes, or the names of the
persons voted for, and to prove which of them is correct; and
the return when found to be erroneous may be corrected by the,
record; and the governor and council are required to count and
declare for any person all votes intentionally cast for such person,
although his name on the ballot is misspelled or written with only
the initial or initials of his christian name or names; and they may
bear testimony upon oath in relation to such votes in order to get
at the intention of the electors and decide accordingly." But they
are nowhere authorized to extend their inquiries beyond these
limits; to inquire into the validity of meetings; whether or not
votes were cast by aliens or minors, or any of the various questions
involving the validity of the result. Their judgment is not made
conclusive. In case of senators and representatives, the final
determination rests with the senate and house. So in reference to
county officers, the courts in the last resort must determine the
rights of the parties. If it were not so, if the canvassing-board
erred in their computations; if they should wilfully or ignorantly
disregard the law; rejecting legal and valid returns, and receiving
and acting upon illegal and invalid returns, there would be no
remedy for the party duly elected. "If," say the court, in their
opinion (25 Maine 570) "the legislature had deemed it expedient,
and had actually intended to constitute the governor and council
judges generally of the election of county officers, it would have
been easy for them to have been explicit to that effect; not having
done so, it must be presumed that nothing of the kind was
intended." It is abundantly obvious this must be so, since the
right of full investigation is withheld from them.
County commissioners hold their office by popular election. If
one nit legally elected, is erroneously declared to be elected, the
will of the people is disregarded. An usurper holds an office to
which he has no right. " The usurpation of an office is not an
VOL. XXVIII.-89
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invasion of executive prerogative," observes NOTT, J., in State v.
Deliesseline, 1 McCord 52, "but of the rights of the people; and
the only method by which these rights can be protected, is through
the instrumentality of the courts of justice."
In accordance with these views it has been uniformly held by
this and all other courts where the question has arisen, that the
decision of the canvassing-board is only prima facie evidence, that
the real title to an office depends upon the votes cast, and that the
tribunal before which the question arises, will investigate the facts
of the election, the votes cast, and the legality of the action of
the canvassing-board: People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; People v. trail,
20 Wend. 12 ; State v. qovernor, 1 Dutch. 848 ; Peoplev. 17tacher,
55 N. Y. 525. The series of opinions of this court from that in
25 Maine 568, to the present, concur in the conclusion that the
action of the governor and council, so far as relates to all matters
pertaining to the case under consideration, in canvassing the
returns, is purely ministerial, and is to be confined strictly within
the bounds of the constitution and the statutes enacted in furtherance of the constitution.
The underlying principle is that the election and not the return
is the foundation of the right to an elective office, and hence it has
been held competent to go behind the ballot box, and purge the
returns by proof that votes were received and counted, which were
cast by persons not qualified to vote: People v. Pease, 27 N. Y.
45. "Freedom of inquiry in investigating the title to office,"
observes ANDREWS, J., in People v. Thacher, 55 N. Y. 531, "tends
to secure fairness in the conduct of elections, faithfulness and integrity on the part of returning officers, and it weakens the motive
to fraud or violence by diminishing the chances that they may
prove successful in effecting the objects for which they are usually
employed.
3. The ground is taken "that the vote of the .city of Portland
was rightly rejected as illegal by the governor and council, the
return thereof not being in accordance with the statute, in that it
did not contain the names of all the candidates voted for with the
number of votes set against them."
It is conceded that if the vote of Portland is to be counted, the
plaintiff was duly elected. The whole number of votes cast was
six tbousand three hundred and thirteen, of which two were
returned as scattering.
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None of the votes of the city of Portland were counted. They
were all thrown out. Why ? Because the ward meetings were not
regularly notified ? Because the ward meetings were not legally
organized ? Because those not qualified electors were permitted to
vote ? Because there was fraud or intimidation at the meeting ?
Because the votes of qualified voters were rejected ? Because the
votes were not received, sorted, counted and declared in open ward
meeting ? Because a fair record of the result was not seasonably
made? Because the returns duly sealed and attested vere not
transmitted to the secretary of state within the time required?
Because of any informality, great or small? No. None of these
causes were pretended,-much less proved,-but because out of the
whole number of votes cast, two were returned as scattering, that is
because two wrote scattering on their ballots or because two voted
for candidates not voted for by anybody else, and the clerk returned
them as scattering instead of giving the names of persons for whom
the votes were cast. Thus and for such cause, six thousand three
hundred and eleven voters, being over a third of the voters of the
county of Cumberland, were disfranchised-for they were equally
disfranchised whether they voted for one candidate or the other.
This disfranchisement was for no neglect or omission of theirs.
This is a government of the people. Their will as expressed by
the ballot is what is to be ascertained and declared. To disfranchise six thousand three hundred and eleven voters because two
ballots were returned as scattering, is a novel mode of giving
expression to the popular will. If the citizens voting can have
their votes nullified for such cause, any voter by writing "scattering" on his ballot or any clerk by returning a vote or votes under
this head, may annihilate a majority however large. No man can
be sure his vote will be effective.
The word "scattering" written on a ballot indicates the name
of an individual or it does not. If a name then it should be counted.
If it is not the name of an individual, then perhaps it may be regarded as a blank vote. It is, at any rate, a ballot. It is provided by Revised Statutes, c. 4, § 32, as amended by c. 212 of the
Acts of 1878, that "in order to determine the result of any election by ballot, the number of persons who voted at such election,
shall first be ascertained by counting the whole number of ballots
given in, which shall be distinctly stated and recorded." The
whole number of ballots counted, including the votes returned scattering, the petitioner was most assuredly elected; for in the case
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under consideration, these votes however added or subtracted
would not have changed the result.
The office of county commissioner is one created by statute, not
by the Constitution. As a canvassing-board, the governor and
council act in relation to this office under Revised Statutes, c. 78,
§ 5, as amended by c. 212 of the Acts of 1878, and by that act
the whole number of ballots given should have been counted.
Had they been so counted the plaintiff's election was assured.
The rule obtains in every state, that an election is not to be set
aside and declared void, merely because certain illegal votes were
received, which do not change the result of the election: he
People v. Tuthill et al., 31 N. Y. 550; Judkin8 v. Hill, 50 N.
H. 140; School .District v. Gibbs, 2 Cush. 39. In Bx parte
Murphy, 7 Cow. 153, two ballots were put in the box on the names
of two persons who were formerly voters, but who had died some
weeks before the election. "To warrant the setting aside the election," the court observes, "it must appear affirmatively, that the
successful ticket received a number of improper votes, which if
rejected, would have brought it down to a minority. The mere
circumstance that improper votes were received, will not vitiate an
election." The entire vote should never be rejected, when it is
possible to ascertain the fraudulent vote: M)fann v. Cassidy, 1
Brewster (Penn.) 32. In an action to determine the right to an
office, the court may look beyond the returns and even the ballot
boxes, if necessary, to ascertain the truth: 1he People v. Cook,
14 Barb. 259.
Now there is no allegation whatever that illegal or fraudulent
votes were cast. Whether the votes returned as scattering were
cast by persons not authorized to vote, or fraudulently cast, or for
a candidate ineligible, or erroneously returned as scattering by mistake or fraud, inasmuch as they did not change the result, the petitioner having a plurality of over six hundred votes should have
been declared elected.
It is proper to add that the amended return shows the names for
whom the votes counted as scattering were given-to wit: William
B. Skimln. So that in truth, there remains no conceivable ground
upon which the respondent can claim to hold over.
The decision of the canvassing-board was at war with the law of
the land, the rights of parties, the will of the people and the principles upon which alone a republican government can rest.
Judgment for the petitioners.

BROWN v. HAZLEHURST.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
BROWN v. HAZLEHURST.
A receiver ought regularly to apply to the court under whose authority he is acting
for leave to expend the funds of the trust even for purposes beneficial to the property, as e. g. for insurance.
But where he does insure without leave, if the circumstances were such that :eavr
would hare been granted, a court of equity will ratify his act as if it had been
authorized at the time.

0X exceptions to a receiver's account.
There being a bill pending to set aside a conveyance and exchange of certain real estate, consisting of a hotel and stores in the
city of Baltimore, plaintiff was appointed receiver of the property,
and upon the termination of the suit, filed his report and account.
An item of credit in the account, amounting to $187, for the
renewal for one year of policies of insurance on the hotel, was
excepted to by the complainant in the original bill. The policies
were the same which the complainant had himself taken out the
year before, and the premiums paid were the same. The receiver
had not applied to the Circuit Court for authority to renew the
insurance.
The exceptions were sustained by an order of the Circuit Court,
and from this order the receiver appealed.
. J. Brown and T. B. Mackall, for appellant.
James Afackubin, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALVEY, J.-There is no doubt of the general rule, and it is
a wholesome one, that a receiver will not be permitted to lay out
more than a small sum, at his own discretion, in the preservation
or improvement of the property under his charge; but he should in
all cases where it is practicable, or the circumstances of the case
will permit, before involving the estate in expense, apply to the
court for authority for so doing. But this general rule, however
salutary it may be, should not be so rigidly and sternly enforced
as to work wrong and injustice, where the receiver has acted in
good faith and under such circumstances as will enable the court
to see that if previous authority had been applied for it would have
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been granted. The justice and right of the matter must depend,
to a great extent, upon the special circumstances of each case that
may be presented.
In the case of Blunt v. Clitherow, 6 Yes. 799, the receiver
applied to be allowed some 4611. as money expended in repair of
the dwelling-house on the estate, and the claim being resisted upon
the ground that ihe expenditure had not been sanctioned by the
court, the Master of the Rolls, Sir WILLIAm GRIANT, directed an
inquiry into the circumstances of the expenditure, and whether the
same was for the benefit of the estate, and it afterwards appearing
that the expenditure was made by the direction of the trustees, the
claim was allowed without further objection or inquiry.
So in the case of the Attorney-General v. Vigor, 11 Yes. 563,
upon motion that the receiver should be allowed for necessary
repairs that had been done, Lord ELDON directed an inquiry
whether the repairs were reasonable, at the same time observing
that the court was not in the habit of permitting receivers and
committees to apply the trust funds in repairs to any considerable
extent without a previous application.
And again, in the case of Tempest v. Ord, 2 Mer. 55, upon
:pplication for a restraining order upon a receiver against paying
out funds for the erection of buildings upon the premises without
the previous direction of the court, Lord ELDoN said that formerly
the court never permitted a receiver to lay out money without a
previous order of the court, but now where the receiver had laid
out money without such previous order, it was usual to refer it to
the master to see if the transaction was beneficial to the parties,
and if found to be so, the receiver was allowed the money so laid
out, and accordingly an order was made referring the matter to the
master to consider and state to the court whether the buildings
then being erected were fit and necessary and for the benefit of the
soveral parties interested in the premises.
It thus appears that the right of the receiver to have allowance
for his expenditure on account of the estate, does not always
depend upon his having obtained the previous order of the court,
but it may depend upon the circumstances and requirements of the
estate.
In this case the receiver was appointed by the court under an
agreement of the parties, and by the agreement and order he was
alone fo have charge of the property specified. His appointment
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determined no right, nor did it affect the title o^ the property in
any way; the legal title was in the complainant in the cause, Mr.
Hazlehurst, subject to the ultimate judgment of the court, and the
appointment of the receiver was for and on behalf of all the parties concerned, and not of the complainant only. The order
making the appointment was without special directions ab to powers
and duties; it simply placed him in the exclusive charge of the
property. The property consisted of a large hotel and seieral
stores thereunder in the city of Baltimore.
At the time the receiver took possession he found the hotel property under an insurance in several offices, to an aggregate amount'
of $25,000. This insurance had been placed upon the property
by Mr. Hazlehurst, the party now objecting to the allowance to the
receiver of the premiums paid for renewals or keeping alive these
policies on the property. The ground of objection is, that a previous order ought to have been obtained before the renewal premiums were paid by the receiver. In other words, that the
premiums were paid by the receiver without authority, and, therefore, he has no right to claim reimbursement under the circumstances of the case. To this, under the circumstances, we do not
agree. There is not the least pretence that there was any want of
good faith on the part of the receiver in continuing the insurance
on the hotel property. On the contrary, it is conceded by the
learned judge below, and not controverted by counsel, that the
nature of the property, and. the fact that it was not occupied, rendered it proper that it should be insured. In this we suppose
every one will agree.
It is therefore safe to assume that if application had been made
to the court for authority to continue the insurance on the property,
it would have been given. In keeping the policies alive, the
receiver was only keeping the property in the condition that he
found it in. The very object and purpose of his office was to
preserve and protect the property for the party who should
ultimately be declared to be the owner of it; and the continuing
the insurance was but a safe and usual means to the end to be
accomplished. It was not for the one party or the other to object
to the insurance; the court having assumed control and jurisdiction
over the property would have directed what was proper and
reasonable for its protection; and while it would have been proper
and more regular for the receiver to have applied for authority to
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insure, we think his act in continuing the existing policies should
be adopted by the court, upon the principle that where a trustee or
other officer of the court has exercised a power which, if previously
applied for, would, without doubt, have been granted, a court of
equity will, in the absence of proof showing the inexpediency and
injustice of so doing, ratify and adopt the act done, as if it had
been previously authorized: Tyaon v. Mickle, 2 Gill 376. The
adoption or rejection of the act must depend not on the events subsequently occurring, or the final result of the suit, but on the state
of things existing and apparent at the time of the act done. The
amount of the premiums paid was only $187.50, and it is shown
in proof that it has been customary, though certainly not strictly
justified upon principle, for receivers to insure property under
their charge without special orders of the court, and to have their
expenditures allowed. Under the circumstances of this case, we
think the receiver should be allowed the amount of the premiums
paid by him, and we shall therefore reverse the order appealed
from, and remand the cause.
Order reversed and cause remanded.
ROBINSON, J., dissenting.-Without the direction of -the court
or the consent of the parties in interest, the appellant insured the
hotel property for $25,000, and the question in this appeal is,
whether he should be allowed, in the account of his receivership,
the premiums paid by him on the policies of insurance.
The bill under which the appellant was appointed, prayed for
the appointment of a receiver to collect and receive the rents, pending the litigation, and the' order of the court by which he -was
appointed, directed that he should have charge of the property.
The language of the order is broad enough to 'embrace all the
powers usually belonging to the office of a receiver, but we cannot
agree that it confers the extraordinary powers to make repairs and
insuro the property as explicitly as if special directions to that
effect had been inserted.
According to our construction, it conferred upon the appellant
the usual and ordinary powers of a receiver. The question then
is, what are such powers? All agree that he is but the officer of
the court, or as he is sometimes styled, the hand of the court, his
possession being nothing more or less than the possession of the
court, and yet it is ol'vious that it is an office of trust and confi-
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dence, necessarily involving to some extent, the exercise of discretionary powers. But all the authorities agree that this discretion
is one of the most limited character, and that he ought, from time
to time, to apply to the court for authority to do such acts as may
be beneficial to the estate. Strictly speaking, according to the
earlier English practice, he bad no right to bring or defend actions,
or to let the estate, or to lay out money for any purpose, unless
by special leave of the court: Story's Eq. Jur., vol. 2, sect. 833"
Jeremy's Eq. Jur., b. 1, ch. 7, sect. 1. And in Swaby v. Dickon,
5 Sim. 629, where the receiver had, without authority of the court,
defended an action growing out of a distress made by him upon
the tenant of the estate, the court refused to allow him his costs
of the action.
A more liberal practice now prevails, and where it satisfactorily
appears that the receiver has acted in good faith and without prejudice to the interests of the parties, courts are disposed to ratify the
exercise of a reasonable discretion. It is always safe, and the
proper practice, to apply to the court for directions in regard to
the expenditure of money, because he has no right to involve the
estate in expense, without the sanction of the court. We have
not been able, after a careful examination, to find a case in which
the power of a receiver to insure property without the direction of
the court has been recognised, and yet we do not mean to say that
in no case should the premium paid by him for insurance be
allowed. We are constrained, however, to say that under the circumstances of this case, the premium paid by the appellant was
properly disallowed by the court.
In the bill under which the appellant was appointed, the complainant charges that the defendants, MeShanes, represented this
hotel as being valuable property, under a lease to a responsible tenant for five years, at a yearly rental of five thousand dollars, and
that upon the faith of such representations the exchange of properties was made. That subsequently he discovered that the hotel
property was without any rental value whatever, that it was burdened with yearly ground-rents, amounting to twenty-five hundred
dollars, and without setting out all the allegations in the bill, it is
sufficient to say the complainant substantially charged that the property was' without any actual or marketable value. These averments, it is true, are denied by the defendants, but the appellant
had notice that the complainant, then in possession, and to whom
VOL. XXVIII.-90
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it was ultimately decreed the property belonged, had under oath
alleged that it was without any value.
In addition to this it appears that the appellant was unable to
rent it, and never received one dollar rental from the hotel proper
during his receivership.
In view of these facts, whatever may
have been the judgment of the appellant in the premises, it was
plainly his duty to have applied to the court for authority before
subjecting the estate to the expenses of insurance on policies
amounting to $25,000.
In reply to this it was said he found the property insured at the
time of his appointment, and he did nothing more than renew the
policies. But this insurance was effected by the complainant,
immediately upon the exchange of the properties, and at a time
when relying upon the representation of the defendants, he estimated its value at $25,000. So soon, however, as he found out
that the property was in fact without any value whatever, he filed
a bill to set aside the exchange on the ground of fraud, and this
bill was pending when the appellant renewed the policies.
Now, although we are satisfied the receiver in this case acted in
good faith, yet it would be a wide departure from the well settled
practice limiting and defining the powers of receivers to allow,
under such circumstances, the appellant to burden the estate with
the costs of insurances on policies amounting to $25,000, when
the very bill under which he was appointed alleged that the property was without any value. To say the least, it was the duty of
the receiver to have applied to the court for the authority to insure
before subjecting the parties in interest to such costs. For these
reasons I dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court.

United States Circuit Court; District of Indiana.
ADAMS,

AssIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF VAN CAMP & SoN, V.

MERCHANTS'

NATIONAL BANK OF INDIANAPOLIS.
'While in some respects an assignee in bankruptcy stands in the place of the bankrapt himself, with no other or different rights or equities, in many other respects he
occupies a different position as the representative of the creditors, and particularly
where acts have been done by the bankrupt, the effect of which is to impair the legal
or equitable rights of creditors.
An assignee has the rights of a judgment-creditor, where a mortgage or pledge is
invalid for want of any element requisite under the law.

ADAMS v. MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK.
A firm, shortly before its bankruptcy, applied to its bank for a loan of money to
nuy apples. The bank made the loan, placing the money to the credit of the firm's
general account, upon the execution of a note by the bankrupts with certain sureties,
and on the condition, that said bankrupts would convert their storehouse into a public warehouse, by taking out a permit therefor, under the state statute, and would
place the apples as purchased in said warehouse, issuing warehouse receipts therefor,
to a third party, to be by him indorsed and left with the bank, as collateral security
for said loan; which was done, but the apples remained in said warehouse in the
possession of the bankrupts until after their bankruptcy, and -then came into the
posses-sion of the assignees. Held, that said receipts were not valid warehouse
receipts under the statute, or at common law.
Hdd, also, that there was no pledge of the property, because the possession was
not in the pledgee.
Held, also, that the contract was in the nature of a chattelmortgage, and invalid
as to creditors for want of possession in the mortgagee or record, as required by
the statute of Indiana.
There is a distinction between the case of an attempt to secure or pay a precedent
debt and that of a present receipt of money or property by the bankrupts, as part
of the contract under inestigation ; but this alone cannot render a contract valid
as against creditors, which otherwise is unlawful.

This was a petition to review the order and judgment of the
District Court, under see. 4986 U. S. Revised Statutes.
The statute of Indiana as to chattel-mortgages is as follows:
"No assignment of goods by way of mortgage shall be valid
against any other person than the parties thereto, where such goods
are not delivered to the mortgagee or assignee and retained by him,
unless such assignment or mortgage shall be acknowledged, as provided in caseg of deeds of conveyance, and recorded in the recorder's office of the county where the mortgagor resides within ten
days after the execution thereof."
The other facts are stated in the opinion
HeMa8ter & Boice and Judah & Caldwell, for assignee.
B. 0. Hawkins and Daleyj'& Pickerill, for defendants.
DRUMMOND, J.-In the fall of 1877, Van Camp & Son were
engaged in business at Indianapolis, in buying and selling apples
and other produce, and in the manufacturing and putting up of
meats, fruits, &c. They had a storehouse at Indianapolis, where
they kept articles which they wished to bold for better prices. At
that time they applied to the bank for a loan of $2000. The bank
agreed to make the loan upon the execution of a note by the bankrupts with certain sureties, and on the condition that they would
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convert their storehouse into a public warehouse, of class "B,"' by
taking out a permit therefor under the statute, and would place the
eight hundred barrels of apples, for the purchase of which they
.made the loan, in the warehouse, issuing warehouse receipts therefor, to a certain person by name, the son of one of the firm, to be
by him endorsed and left with the bank as collateral security. This
arrangement was carried out, the note executed with sureties, the
apples purchased and placed in the warehouse, for which a permit
was taken out, the store being made a warehouse of class "B,"
and the receipts issued and endorsed to the bank as provided in the
agreement. The son, to whom the receipts were given, had no
interest in the property and had no business connection with the
firm in any way. During the time that these transactions occurred,
the bankrupts kept their general account with the bank, and deposited and drew out money as they received or needed the same;
and the note, discounted by the bank, was placed as a credit to
their general account. In January 1878, Van Camp & Son were
adjudged bankrupts by the District Court for this district; and the
apples, covered by the receipts referred to, together with the other
property, came into the hands of the assignee and were sold by
the order of the District Court, the proceeds being permitted to
remain in the hands of the assignee, subject to the same rights
which existed against the property itself. Upon application by the
bank to the District Court, requesting that a lien might be declared
in its favor on the fund arising from the sale of the apples, the
dssignee was ordered to pay the amount of the note out of the fund
in his hands, on the ground that the bank had an absolute lien
upon the property, for which it held the warehouse receipts. That
order the assignee asks to have reviewed by this court; and the
question before the court is, whether the bank had a priority of
lien over the general creditors as the District Court adjudged.
There is nothing in the statement of the case to indicate that
the bankrupts used their warehouse, as a warehouse under the statute, in any other way than for the purpose specially intended by
the bank. It does not appear that the property of any other person than that of the bankrupts was stored in the warehouse. The
case then was one where the bankrupts, having purchased and taken
possession of property, stored it in their warehouse, ,for which a
permit had been obtained as class "B," and issued receipts for the
same and transferred them through a third person, to whom they
were issued, to the bank as collateral security for the loan made.
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By the Act of March 9th 1875, 1 Davis (1876) 927, public
warehouses are divided into two classes, "A" and "B."
Any
person or incorporation may keep a public warehouse, by obtaining
a permit from the auditor of the county in which the warehouse
is situated. The warehouse shall continue subject to the provisions
of the law, until the owners shall file a notice in the auditor's office,
renouncing the character of public warehousemen.
Class "-A" embraces warehouses in which grain is stored in
bulk, and that of different owners mixed together. Class "B"
embracut warehouses where property of any kind is stored for a
consideration.
Most of the sections following the first and second, to which
reference has been particularly made above, refer to the storing of
grain in warehouses of class "A."
The 14th section of the act
declares that receipts for property stored in any class of warehouses
shall be negotiable and transferable by the endorsement of the
warehouse receipts, which are to be given for the property stored;
and the endorsement of the party to whom the receipt is given shall
constitute a valid transfer of the property. The endorsement is to
be deemed a warranty that the endorsee has a good title and lawful authority to sell the property named in the receipt.
All warehouse receipts for property stored in warehouses of class
' B" are to distinctly state on theirface the brand or distinguishing mark of the property.
The fourth section of the act provides specifically for the issue
of a receipt for property stored in warehouses of class "A." There
seems to be no such provision in relation to property stored in
warehouses of class "B"; but the 14th section of the act speaks
of warehouse receipts for property stored in any class of public
warehouses, and includes of course class "B" as well as "A."
. There is nothing to show that the money advanced by the bank
to the bankrupts was specifically appropriated in the purchase of
the apples covered by the receipts; but they seem to have been
paid for as other purchases were, by checks on the bank drawn on
the general account of the bankrupts.
Independent of the fact
that there is no evidence to show any other receipt issued by the
bankrupts as warehousemen for property deposited in their wvarehouse, and of the fact claimed that these were receipts given by
them of their own property in the warehouse, substantially to themezelves (the son of one of the bankrupts being merely a nominal

ADAMS v. MERCHANTS' NATIONAL BANK.

party in whose name the receipts were issued and who endorsed
them to the bank), the receipts can hardly be considered as valid
under the statute. They are as follows: "Received of Cortland
Van Camp, subject to his order, and deliverable on return of this
receipt, 150 barrels of apples for storage in fruit house." Signed
.by the bankrupts and endorsed by Cortland Van Camp; the other
receipts are similar. Now the statute of the state in relation to
warehouses of class B. provides for property stored therein "for a
consideration;" which can hardly be said to be true of the property in this case, as it belonged to the bankrupts themselves by
whom the receipts were issued. And the law also declares that all
warehouse receipts for property stored in warehouses of class B,
should distinctly state on their face the brand or distinguishing
mark of the property, which these receipts did not state, and so
were not within the terms of the statute. I think, therefore under
all the circumstances of the case they cannot be considered to come
'within the meaning of the special statute in relation to wardhousse
of class B. Indeed, that is hardly claimed by counsel; and so the
case must turn upon the general law upon the subject.
. If this had been a sale of the property to the bank
and these
receipts had been given upon the sale, there would, perhaps, not be
so much difficulty about the case; but that is not claimed by the
bank, and it is clear from the facts, that there was no sale unless
the circumstances attending the transaction amounted to a sale.
In ncarly all the cases which have been cited in support of the
decree nerein, tile court found that there was a sale of the property. For instance, in Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, the case
proceeds throughout upon the assumption that the party through
whom the plaintiff claimed the property, had purchased it of the
warehousemen, who issued the receipts therefor. It was the case,
therefore, of a sale of property for which receipts were given, and
in consequence of which the vendors became bailees of the purchasers, and so the title of the property was in the purchasers or
in their assignees by virtue of the endorsement of the warehouse
receipts. The case of Gibson v. (Jhillicothe Bank, 11 Ohio St.
811, was in many respects like this, and there would seem, from a
statement of the evidence, to be strong grounds for the claim that
it was a case of mere security, although the contract under which
the advances were made and the receipts given in that case are not
set forth; but the court found that the receipts were not merely
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given as security, but that the money was advanced upon an agrve.
meat that the title of the property was passed when the receipts
were given; and that it was to be held for the payment of the
advances made. In Yenni v. fcNamee, 45 N. Y. 614, the court
referred to the difference between the case of a sale of property for
which a receipt was given and one where it was a mere security,
distinguishing the case from that of Gibson v. Stevens, and holding that as the property was held merely as a security, and there
was not an absolute sale, it came within the principle of a mortgage
of chattels, and the law of the state not being complied with, it was
invalid as against other creditors.
In the case of Shepardson v. Green, 21 Wis. 539, the owners
of coal gave a warehouse-receipt to the plaintiff for a certain
quantity of coal then in their possession. They treated the coal
as their own, and sold portions of it to their customers, appropriating the proceeds to their own use, and afterwards a third person
purchased all the coal which the parties who had given the warehouse-receipts then had in their possession. The court found
against the warehouse-receipts in that case, and the judgment was
affirmed by the Supreme Court on the ground the receipt was given
as a security only, and in the nature of a chattel mortgage. There
seems to have been a misapprehension by the counsel on both sides
in this case as to the effect of the decision of the court in that case.
The question arose in a different form in the case of Shepardson
v. Cary, 29 Wis. 34, where the court intimates (although it was
clearly not necessary to the decision of that case, as they held that
the former judgment was a bar to the latter,) that a warehousereceipt given by a warehouseman transferred the property, and the
implication is, that if it had appeared in the former case that the
parties who gave the receipt were regular warehousemen, that
the decision would have been different in Shepardson v. Green.
In Shepardson v. Cary this language is used by the court in referring to Gibson v. Stevens and Gibson v. M~illicothe Bank, and to
Rice v. Cutler, 17 Wis. 351: "Such relation, and the consequent
rights and obligations of the parties, are held by the decisions just
referred to, even where the sale is made as collateral security for
the payment of a debt due from the warehouseman, not to be.
affected by the statute regulating the filing of mortgages of personal
property, nor by the act concerning warehouse-receipts and bills
of lading," which language can hardly be said to be justified, as
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we have already seen, either by the case of Gibson v. Stevens, or
by the case of Gibson v. The Chillicothe Bank. And Bice v
Cutler was, like the others, one of sale, and not of mere security.
There may be some question, perhaps, whether the parties,
having relied upon a title under the statute of this state in relation
to warehouses, can change their ground and rely upon the efficacy
at common law, of the receipts which were given; but waiving
that question, there not having been any actual sale of the apples
in this case, in order to render the contract valid as to creditors,
there must have been a pledge or a mortgage of the property. As
already stated, the bank has not proceeded upon the assumption
that there was a sale of the property, but only that it had a lien
for the money loaned. There was no pledge of the property
because the possession was not with the pledgee. Possession
actual or constructive is in general indispensable to the validity of
a pledge as against creditors. Neither was there any valid mortgage of the property, because there was no possession in the
mortgagee, nor was there, in fact, any written mortgage. *If the
receipts and the circumstances connected with them constituted a
mortgage, then it was not recorded, as required, by the statute of
Indiana. Under the facts I cannot regard this as anything more
than a security, given by the bankrupts to the bank, for the loan
that was made. It, therefore, was in the nature of a chattel mortgage, and for the reasons already stated, as such it was invalid,
under the statute. Undoubtedly this was a valid contract as
between the parties, and it is claimed it was therefore valid as
against the creditors of the bankrupts because the assignee, it is
insisted, can be in no better position than the bankrupts themselves,
he simply being the representative of the bankrupts, and standing
as they stood in relation to their rights and equities. But that I
do not understand to be the true rule in cases of this kind. The
assignee represents all the creditors of the bankrupts. He occupies
as such a different position from that of the bankrupts themselves.
This has always been the rule established in this circuit, and I
think is the better rule. The reasons for it have been given in In
re Gurney, 7 Biss. 414. They are also stated by Mr. Justice
.STRONG, in Miller v. Jones, 15 B. Reg. 150. The same rule is
also laid down in the case of Allen v. Massey, 17 Wall. 851. If
it once be admitted that the contract, which is the subject of controversy, is fraudulent as to creditors, then by the express provis-
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ion of the Bankrupt Law it is competent for the assignee to attack
it, and to cause it to be abrogated for the benefit of creditors. I
think that the assignee has the right of a judgment-creditor, where
the mortgage or the pledge is invalid in consequence of wanting
any element requisite under the law, or under the statute. This is
the rule laid down in In re Gurney, and also in Miller v. Jones.
In the latter case, while admitting there are decisions to the con.
trary, STRONG, J., says: "The adjudication of bankruptcy is
equivalent to the recovery of a judgment and a levy." It seems
to me that any other rule than this would be fatal to the rights of
creditors, and would render the Bankrupt Law in one particular
almost entirely inoperative.
It is also claimed, on the part of the bank, that the bankiupts
received a considerable fund at the time that this contract was
made, which went to increase their estate, and, therefore, it not
being a security, given for an antecedent indebtedness, but for
money actually received at the time, it ought to be held valid.
Undoubtedly there are distinctions between a case where an effort
is made to secure or pay a precedent debt, and that where money
or property is received at the time by the bankrupt as a part of
the contract which is the subject of investigation; but that circumstance alone cannot render a contract valid as against creditors,
which otherwise is unlawful, because that would enable one creditor
to obtain a priority of payment over another; and to hold the contract valid in this case, would give the bank a preference over the
general creditors of the bankrupts, which ought not to be allowed
unless the contract is in all respects valid. This principle is
recognised, and the law as to pledges and the rights of an assignee
in bankruptcy, as the representative of the creditors, stated in
Casey v. Cavaroc, 6 Otto 467.
The result is that the decree of the District Court must be reversed, and the bank stand as a common instead of a preferred
creditor of the bankrupts' estate.
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